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SUMMARY
Most privatizations in Canada occurred in the 10-year period from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s, and while many of the remaining candidates are both politically and economically
problematic, the Harper government has signalled its renewed interest in more privatizations.
This paper, written by two of Canada’s leading experts on the subject, comprehensively
assesses hard data from the earlier privatizations in Canada, including sectors such as energy,
transport and telecommunications. They find that the overall impacts have been largely
positive, in many cases impressively so. Key economic indicators such as capital expenditures,
dividends, tax revenues and sales per employee tended to increase, while others such as
employment initially fell, only to rise again over the long term. Ultimately, most of the privatized
firms continue to operate efficiently, making them positive contributors to Canadians’ social
welfare through the provision of increased economic opportunities, higher profits and taxes.
Drawing on lessons learned, the authors propose a common-sense framework to guide future
privatizations and ensure all Canadians derive the maximum possible benefits from them. No
Canadian government has ever formulated such a plan for a privatization regime, making this
paper a must-read for anyone with a stake in the future of Canadian business.    
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1. INTRODUCTION
The most extensive wave of privatizations in Canada followed, and to some extent imitated, the
trailblazing privatizations initiated in the United Kingdom by the Margaret Thatcher
government.1, 2 Most privatizations in Canada occurred in the 10-year period from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s.3 The main purpose of this paper is to review the existing evidence and
to provide new evidence concerning the impact of Canadian privatizations on the social welfare
of Canadians. We present a comprehensive evaluation of one major Canadian privatization
(Canadian National Railway) including an estimate of the net social benefits to Canadians and
others. For most of the other large privatizations in Canada, we use proxies of social welfare,
focusing on changes in various aspects of operating performance from up to five years prior to
privatization, through 21 years following privatization.
A second purpose is to broadly consider the potential for future privatizations. The last decade
has been a relatively quiet period in terms of privatization at both the federal and provincial
levels. There are a number of reasons for this privatization hiatus. Certainly a major contributing
factor, at least at the federal level, is that the low-hanging fruit has already been privatized. This
low-hanging fruit consisted of commercial crown corporations that operated in reasonably
competitive markets. The absence of significant market failures provided an economic (social
welfare) justification for privatization. Privatization of these firms also provided political
benefits because the proceeds from the sales helped to reduce government deficits and debt
levels.
Currently, the remaining candidates for privatization in Canada would be both economically and
politically more problematic than those that took place previously. However, in 2009 the then-
minority Harper government at least mooted the possibility of privatizing a number of “not self-
sustaining” crown corporations that included the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),
Via Rail and the Cape Breton Development Corporation.4 Indeed, the recently announced sale of
the Commercial Reactor Sales and Service Division of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL)
may indicate a renewed interest in further privatization by the now-majority Harper government.
At the provincial level, there is a much greater amount and variety of crown corporation fruit
still hanging, but, again, few of the plausible privatization candidates could be described as low-
hanging, whether from an economic efficiency perspective or a political popularity perspective.
On the other hand, some candidates are quite large and would deliver significant revenues to
provincial governments. Prominent examples of possible privatization candidates at the
provincial level include the provincial electric power corporations and a range of infrastructure
entities, such as BC Ferries Corporation.  
1 Feigenbaum, H., J. Henig and C. Hamnet, 1998, Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 Seldon, A. and D. Collings, 1999, Britain Under Thatcher, London: Longman.
3 Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, and A.R. Vining, 2003, "Privatization in North America," in David Parker and David Saal
(eds.), International Handbook on Privatization, Chapter 7, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003, 129-160.
4 Mayeda, A., “Major Canadian Government Assets could be Sold,” Canwest News Service, February 17, 2009;
Lammam, C. and N. Veldhuis, 2009, “It’s Time to Privatize Canada’s Crown Corporations,” Fraser Forum, 05/09. 
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This paper has four following sections. Section 2 explains what we mean by privatization,
summarizes what has been privatized in Canada by federal and provincial governments,
discusses alternative privatization methods and estimates government receipts from
privatizations. Section 3 lays out a theoretical framework to comprehensively assess the social
welfare impacts of privatization and discusses the expected theoretical impacts of privatization.
Using this framework, Section 4 assesses the performance of Canadian entities following their
privatization. It reviews an earlier social cost-benefit analysis of the privatization of Canadian
National Railway (CNR) and contains new analysis of the pre- and post-privatization
performance of corporate entities using proxies of social welfare. These proxies provide
quantitative and qualitative information about the benefits of privatization where
comprehensive data are not available. Section 5 considers potential Canadian privatizations.
Although almost all of these companies operate under different economic and structural
conditions than those entities privatized previously, evidence relating to the outcomes of
previous privatizations is somewhat informative of the potential welfare consequences and
other impacts of future privatizations. We conclude the section with some general principles
(meta-rules) for governments in Canada that are considering future privatizations, which we
suggest would help to ensure that Canadians’ social welfare is enhanced.
2. PRIVATIZATION IN CANADA 
Before describing what has been privatized, it is useful to provide some background on
privatization in general. This section presents our definition of privatization and clarifies the
distinction between privatization, public-private partnerships and corporatization. It also
distinguishes between the two major methods of privatization: share-issue privatizations (SIPs)
and direct sales to existing private-sector firms (DSPs). Canadian governments have used both
methods extensively. The distinction is important because it is much more feasible to gather
qualitative and quantitative data that allows one to assess the welfare consequences of SIPs.
What Privatization Is and Is Not
We define privatization as the transfer of a corporate-like entity from government ownership
and control to the private sector. It involves the transfer of an on-going business (or service),
not just the sale of assets. Following privatization, the primary goal typically becomes profit-
maximization.
Some authors treat the formation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a form of
privatization, but we do not. Indeed, PPPs can often be thought of as representing a step away
from private ownership: facilities are initially financed, designed, constructed, maintained and
operated by the private sector, but then, after some (usually long) contractual period (often 30
years), these assets revert to public ownership. Some analysts have labelled the sale of existing
highways as a concession as both a PPP and privatization. While this results in a transfer of an
existing business from the public sector to the private sector for some time period, in almost all
cases ownership of the assets eventually reverts back to the public sector. From a pragmatic
perspective, there have not been any major concession-type sales in Canada, although several 
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3such sales have taken place in the United States.5, 6 For a discussion of the theory concerning
the behaviour and performance of PPPs and an analysis of supporting Canadian case studies,
see Vining and Boardman.7
It is also useful to clarify the distinction between privatization and corporatization because the
two processes are sometimes confused. Although the use of corporatization is not precise, it
generally refers to the process by which an activity is decoupled from direct government
administrative control and placed in a separate legal entity.8 Unless the government is selling
an entity that is already constituted in a corporate form, some form of corporatization is usually
required before privatization can take place. However, corporatization is not necessarily
followed by privatization; indeed, in a number of Canadian cases, governments have explicitly
declared that they do not regard corporatization as a precursor to privatization.9 Corporatization
should not be thought of as a form of privatization because governments retain formal
ownership in the corporatized entities and their primary goal is usually not profitability.
Furthermore, while the day-to-day decisions of a corporatized entity may be entrusted to
managers, politicians retain ultimate control. 
Sometimes government sets up a new, not-for-profit corporation. Control (and, in some sense,
ownership) shifts from government to an independent board, usually with government and
stakeholder representation. This kind of status change is exemplified by the Canadian Air
Navigation System, which was transferred from the federal government to Nav Canada, a non-
share capital, not-for-profit corporation in 1995. Nav Canada is governed by its 15-member
board. Stakeholder groups appoint 10 of these members: the airlines (“aviation users”) appoint
four board members, general aviation appoints one, the federal government appoints three and
the unions appoint two. In addition, the board as a whole appoints four independent directors.
The CEO also sits on the board. Any proposed changes in prices and levels of service must
undergo public notice and regulatory approval. There are also restrictions on the retention of
employees. Some Canadian ports and airports have undergone this type of defederalization.
Some authors10 have argued that such transfers amount to privatization. However, we regard
this organizational change as a form of corporatization, rather than privatization, because the
new entity is not owned and controlled by the private sector. 
Fortinek is sometimes referred to as Canada’s first privatization. In 1979, ownership of the
Eastern and Western Wood Products Laboratories of the Canadian Forest Service was
transferred from the federal government to Fortintek. This newly created entity was owned by
the federal government, provincial governments and a number of private firms. It received (and
continues to receive) funding from all of these organizations. Again, this restructuring is an
example of corporatization, not privatization, given the continued significant public ownership.
5 Boardman, A.E. and A.R. Vining, 2010, “P3s in North America: Renting the Money (in Canada), Selling the Roads
(in the USA)”, in G.A. Hodge, C. Greve, and A.E. Boardman (eds.), International Handbook on Public-Private
Partnerships, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 354-398.
6 In 2003, the Campbell government in BC proposed selling the Coquihalla Highway as a concession to the private
sector. However, it withdrew the proposal in the face of strong political and regional opposition. Eventually, in what
amounted to an act of appeasement, it even removed the existing tolls on the highway.  
7 Vining, A.R and A.E. Boardman, 2008, “Public-Private Partnerships in Canada: Theory and Evidence,” Canadian
Public Administration 51(1), 9-44. 
8 Boardman, A.E. and A. Hunt, 1997, Review of Methodologies for Estimating the Welfare Impacts of Corporatisation
and Privatisation, final report, prepared for The Treasury, New Zealand; Bilodeau, N., C. Laurin and A.R. Vining,
2007, “Choice of Organizational Form Makes a Real Difference: The Impact of Corporatization on Government
Agencies in Canada,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17(1), 119-147; Laegreid, P. and K.
Verhoest (eds.), 2010, Governance of Public Sector Organizations, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
9 Bilodeau, N., C. Laurin and A.R. Vining, 2007, op. cit.
10 Gillen, D. and D. Cooper, 1995, “Public versus Private Ownership and Operation of Airports and Seaports in
Canada,” in F. Palda (ed.), Essays in Canadian Surface Transportation, Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 1-52.
What Has Been Privatized?
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the major entities that have been privatized in Canada
using our definition of privatization. It draws upon, and updates, Boardman, Laurin and
Vining.11 Table 1 pertains to privatized federal entities, while Table 2 pertains to provincial
entities. We use the word entity because some privatizations had previously been only parts
(i.e., subsidiaries) of larger crown corporations. 
TABLE 1: MAJOR CANADIAN FEDERAL PRIVATIZATIONS
11 Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, and A.R. Vining, 2003, op. cit.
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1985
1985
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1987
1987
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1995
1995
1996
1997
1997
1998
2011
Northern Transportation
Company Ltd.
Canada Development Corp.
de Havilland Aircraft
Canada Ltd.
Pêcheries Canada Inc. 
Canadian Arsenals Ltd.
Nanisivik Mines
CN Route (CN subsidiary)
Canadair Ltd.
Northern Canada Power
Commission (Yukon)
Teleglobe Canada
Fishery Products Int. Ltd.
Varity Corporation
CN Hotels (CN Subsidiary)
Air Canada
Northwest Tel Inc. (CN
Subsidiary)
Terra Nova Telecommunications
Inc. (CN Subsidiary)
CNCP Telecom 
Petro-Canada
Nordion International Inc.
Cameco
Telesat Canada 
CN Short line in Nova Scotia
Co-enerco Resources Ltd.
CN Exploration (CN
Subsidiary)
CNR (Canadian National
Railway)
Canarctic Shipping Comp. 
Canada Communication
Group 
National Sea Products Ltd.
Theratronics International Ltd.
AECL’s Commercial Division
Marine shipping
Conglomerate
Airplane manufacturer
Fishery
Munitions manufactuer
Zinc-lead mining
Truck transportation
Air transportation
Electric utility
Telecommunications
Fish harvesting and
processing
Farm equipment
Hotel industry
Transportation
Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Oil and gas
Health sciences
Uranium mining
Satellite
communications
Rail shipping
Oil and gas
Oil and gas
Rail shipping
Maratime shipping
Printing, warehouse,
dist.
Fish harvesting and
processing
Health sciences
Nuclear Power
CC
ME
CC
CC
CC
ME (18%)
CC
CC
CC
CC
Joint1
ME
CC
CC
CC
CC
ME (50%)
CC
CC
Joint2
ME (53%)
CC
CC
CC
CC
ME
CC
ME
CC
CC
Inuvialuit/Nunasi Consortium (negotiated sale)
Two public offerings in 1985 and 1987
Boeing (negotiated Sale)
La Coopérative Agro-Alimentaire Purdel
(negotiated sale)
The SNC group
Mineral Resources International Ltd. 
(qualified auction)
Transport Route Canada Inc. (negotiated sale)
Bombardier Inc.
Yukon Power Corp. (negotiated sale)
Memotec Data Inc. (qualified auction)
Public offering
Public sale of shares and private placement
Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. (negotiated sale)
Two public offerings in 1988 and 1989
BCE Inc. (qualified auction)
Newfoundland Telephone Company 
(negotiated sale)
Canadian Pacific Ltd. (negotiated sale)
Four public offerings in 1991, 1992, 1995
and 2004
MDS Health Group Ltd. (qualified auction)
Five public offerings of the 51% federal share
in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995
Alouette Telecommunications Inc. 
(qualified auction). 
RailTex Inc.
Two public offerings in 1992, 1993
Smart on Resources Ltd.
Public offering 
Fednav Ltd. (qualified auction)
St. Joseph Corporation
Scotia Investments Ltd. (minority stake)
MDS Inc.
SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. (qualified auction)
Total
53
361
99
5
92
6
29
143
76
612
104
40
265
708
200
170
235
5,693
165
444
155
20
75
97
2,079
0.3
7
6
15
15
11,968
Date Company Sector Former Buyer and Proceeds 
Owner Privatization Process ($M)
TABLE 2: MAJOR CANADIAN PROVINCIAL PRIVATIZATIONS
Key: CC=Crown Corporation, ME = Mixed Enterprise (with % of federal Government ownership)
1 Jointly-owned by the federal government (62.6%) and the New Foundland Government (37.4%)
2 Jointly-owned by the federal government (38%) and the Saskatchewan Government (62%)
Source: Adapted from Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, and A.R. Vining, 2003, “Privatization in North America,” in David Parker
and David Saal (eds.), International Handbook on Privatization, Chapter 7, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003,
129-160 and updated.
These tables reveal that most Canadian privatizations occurred between 1985 and 1995. Many
of the privatized entities operate in natural resource, or related, sectors (fisheries, mining, or oil
and gas), transportation (shipping, rail, air, truck) or telecommunications. Six of the federal
privatizations were part of the break-up of the former CN conglomerate.
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1975
1979
1986
1986
1987
1987
1987
1988
1988
1989
1989
1990
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
1995
1997
2002
2002
Alberta Energy Company
British Columbia Resources
Investment Corporation
(BCRIC)
Prince Albert Pulp Company
Saskatchewan Oil and Gas
Corp.
Fishery Products
International (FPI)
Donohue Inc.
SOQUIP Alberta
BC Hydro’s mainland
natural gas division
Saskatchewan Power
Corporation’s (SaskPower)
oil and gas business
Potash Corporation of
Saskatchewan
Manitoba Forestry
Resources Ltd.
Alberta Government
Telephones (Telus)
Cameco
Novatel’s systems business
Novatel’s cellular telephone
manufacturing
Nova Scotia Power Corp 
Suncor
Alberta Liquor Control
Board Stores
Syncrude Canada
Vencap Equities Alberta
Manitoba Telephone
Systems
Ontario Power -4
Hydroelectric Stations
Skeena Cellulose
Oil and gas
Holding company
Pulp
Oil and gas
Fish harvesting and
processing
Forest products
Oil and gas
Natural gas distribution
Oil and gas
Potash mining
Forest products
Telecommunications
Uranium mining
Telecom 
Mobile Telecom
Electricity generation
Oil and Gas
Retail (liquor)
Oil and Gas
Financial Services
Telecommunications
Electricity generation
Pulp and lumber
Alberta CC
B.C. CC
Sask. CC
Sask. CC
Joint1
Quebec ME
Quebec CC
B.C. CC
Sask. CC
Sask. CC
Man. CC
Alberta CC
Joint2
Alberta CC
Alberta CC
N.S. CC
ME
Alberta CC
ME
ME
Man. CC
ON. CC
ME
Two (or more) public offerings in 1974 and
1994
Share Distribution to British Columbians
Weyerhauser
Public offerings in 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990,
1997
Public offering
Quebecor Media and Robert Maxwell 
Sceptre Resources ltd.
Inland Natural Gas
Saskatchewan Oil and Gas (Saskoil)
Two public offerings in 1989 and 1991
Repap Enterprises Inc.
Two public offerings in 1990 and 1991
Four public offerings of the 49% provincial
share in 1991, 1994, 1996 and 2002
Northern Telecom Ltd. (Nortel)
Telexel Holding Ltd.
One public offering 
Public offering
Owner-Licensees
Murphy oil (5%)
Onex
Public offering
Brascan Ltd.
NWBC Timber and Pulp Ltd.
Total
75
0
300
402
62
320
195
741
325
1,237
132
1,766
1,081
38
3
816
299
51
502
174
860
340
6
9,726
Date Company Sector Former Buyer and Proceeds 
Owner Privatization Process ($M)
The Two Main Methods of Privatization
Tables 1 and 2 include a column labelled Buyer and Privatization Process because it is
informative to know how an entity was privatized and who purchased it. Canadian
governments have used two primary methods of privatization. One method is to sell a
government entity to an existing private-sector entity — direct sale privatization (DSP). The
other is to give shares away to the public or to sell shares to the public through public markets
— share issue privatization (SIP). 
DIRECT SALE PRIVATIZATIONS
Federal crown corporations that were disposed through DSPs included: de Havilland Aircraft
Canada, Canadian Arsenals, CN Route, Canadair, Teleglobe Canada and Theratronics
International. Provincial crown corporations that were disposed of via DSPs included: Prince
Albert Pulp, SOQUIP Alberta, Manitoba Forestry Resources and Vencap Equities Alberta.
These privatized entities were relatively small, and operated in niche markets. Their continued
survival as stand-alone private-sector entities would have been difficult. Furthermore, there
were probably synergistic benefits, and therefore potentially higher sale prices, from combining
the privatized entities with larger private-sector firms in similar or related businesses. 
Privatization of the Alberta Liquor Control Board (ACLB) retail stores was different, although
it can still be thought of as a DSP. Each of the 205 store properties was either sold or sub-
leased to the highest bidder (if the offer was above or close to market value), or leases were
terminated or the store was closed and put on the market with a real estate agent. There was no
requirement for each store to remain in liquor retail. Consequently, the stores were sold in
reasonably competitive markets.
Many DSPs took place through privately negotiated sales, and six were organized as auctions
that included bidder qualification procedures. Privatization of the ACLB stores was the only
open auction. 
SHARE-ISSUE PRIVATIZATIONS
Most large crown corporations have been privatized via SIPs. The major federal SIPs were: Air
Canada, Petro-Canada, Co-enerco, and CNR; the provincial SIPs were: Alberta Energy, British
Columbia Resources Investment Corporation (BCRIC), Saskatchewan Oil and Gas Corporation
(SaskOil), Potash Corp, Alberta Government Telephones (which merged with BC Tel in 1999 to
form Telus, as we will refer to it henceforth), Nova Scotia Power (now a subsidiary of Emera)
and Manitoba Telephone Systems (MTS). Two crown corporations that were jointly owned by the
federal and provincial governments were also privatized in this manner: Fishery Products
International (FPI), and Cameco. Some mixed enterprises, entities with partial government
ownership and partial private-sector share ownership,12 were also completely privatized by
issuing shares for the remaining government ownership, including Canada Development
Corporation (CDC) and Suncor. Most of these SIPs operated in somewhat competitive
environments (at least when viewed from a global market perspective) and were large enough to
survive on their own following privatization for at least a reasonable period of time.
12 Eckel, C. and A.R. Vining, 1985, “Elements of a Theory of Mixed Enterprise,” Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, 32 (1), 82-94; Boardman, A.E., C. Eckel and A.R. Vining, 1986, “The Advantages and Disadvantages of
Mixed Enterprise,” in A. Negandhi, H. Thomas and K. Rao (eds.), Multinational Corporations and State-Owned
Enterprises: A New Challenge in International Business, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 221-244.
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Some SIPs contained Canadianization provisions. These provisions were designed to eliminate
or hinder foreign control or ownership. For example, no shareholder could own more than
20 percent of Petro-Canada, although this provision was not enforced in its merger with
Suncor. The Air Canada Public Participation Act (1985) required Air Canada’s corporate
headquarters to remain in Montreal and it also required a majority of the board of directors to
be residents of Canada. Whether there provisions were in the interests of Canadians or not,
they probably reduced the initial share offering prices and governments’ sale proceeds.
Aggregate Revenue Proceeds from Federal and Provincial Privatizations
The federal government received about $12 billion from the privatizations listed in Table 1.
These proceeds were dominated from the sale of Petro-Canada (over $5.5 billion in aggregate)
and CNR (just over $2 billion). Most of the proceeds, including those from Petro-Canada and
CNR, came from SIPs (about $9.5 billion), with the remainder (about $2.5 billion) from DSPs.
Provincial governments received almost $10 billion from the privatizations listed in Table 2;
again, more from SIPs (about $6.5 billion) than from DSPs (just over $3 billion).  
Did the governments leave money on the table? Governments might have left money on the
table for ideological reasons (for example, the promotion of wider share ownership) or for
more naked political vote-maximization reasons. Regarding ideological commitment to
“people’s capitalism,” Boardman et al.13 found that most Canadian shareholders in CNR sold
their shares soon after trading commenced, which tends to indicate that even if wider share
ownership was an intended outcome, it did not happen.
It is difficult to know whether the DSPs were priced to maximize (the net present value of) the
sale price, and we are not aware of research on this question. Extant research has focused on
the underpricing of SIPs. Using a sample of 104 privatizations in 25 countries, Laurin,
Boardman and Vining14 found that SIPs were, on average, underpriced by about the same
percentage as traditional private-sector initial public offerings (IPOs). They argue that, due to
the different characteristics of SIPs vs. IPOs (SIPs were usually considerably larger entities that
had longer operating histories, for example), one would expect less underpricing of SIPs than
IPOs. They conclude, therefore, that underpricing of SIPs was somewhat affected by political
goals. However, these results differ by country type; the degree of underpricing is lower in
large developed countries than in developing countries. Furthermore, the nine Canadian
companies in their sample were underpriced by 6.3 percent, which is considerably less than the
underpricing in other developed countries, which averaged 15.2 percent. Consequently,
Canadian governments do not appear to have left a great deal of money on the table in SIPs.
13 Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, M.A. Moore and A.R. Vining, 2009, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Privatization of
Canadian National Railway,” Canadian Public Policy, 35 (1), 59-83.
14 Laurin, C., A.E. Boardman and A.R. Vining, 2004, “Government Underpricing of Share-Issue Privatizations,” Annals
of Public and Cooperative Economics, 75(3), 399-429.
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3. SOCIAL WELFARE ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATIZATION
From a normative perspective, the most appropriate measure of the social value of privatization
is the net change in social welfare. The aggregate change in social welfare attributable to a
given privatization can be written as:
ΔW = Vp – Vg + λg(Z - Tg)  - λp(Z + Tp) (1)
where W is social welfare, Vp is the value to society of the entity under private operation, Vg
is the value to society of the entity under continued government ownership and operation, and
Z is the sale price. Tg and Tp denote the transactions costs that both government and the
private sector incur, respectively, and λg and λp are shadow multipliers (weights) on
government revenue and private funds, respectively. We explain the relevance of these latter
terms later in this section.
In order to consider the distributional impacts of privatization, it is useful to disaggregate the
total change in social welfare into the changes in value that accrue to different segments in
society (consumers, shareholders, government and employees):
ΔW = λcΔCS + λpΔPS + λgΔGS + λeΔES (2)
where ΔCS is the change in consumer surplus (CS) due to privatization, ΔPS is the change in
producer surplus (PS, economic profits or rents) due to privatization (after tax), ΔGS is the
change in the government surplus (GS, government revenues minus expenditures), ΔES is the
change in the employee surplus (ES), and λc and λe are shadow multipliers for CS and ES,
respectively. We discuss both of these latter terms later. 
The change in consumer surplus will be largely affected by the magnitude of any price change
due to privatization. In turn, price changes will affect quantity changes, depending on the
demand elasticity. In reasonably competitive markets, both prior to and following privatization,
the price and quantity changes attributable to privatization might be quite small. There might,
however, be quality changes that would affect consumer surplus.
The change in producer surplus will reflect the present value of the economic profits following
privatization (net of government taxes and taking into account the opportunity cost of the
shares, Z), less private-sector transaction costs, Tp. In principle, the change in PS should
include changes in the profits of the privatized entity’s competitors and suppliers, as well as the
change in the profits of the privatized entity itself. 
The change in GS should include the amount received from the sale of the privatized entity
less government’s transaction costs, Z - Tg, less the foregone profits that government would
have received if the entity had remained state-owned. It should also include corporate taxes
paid by the company and capital gains taxes paid by individuals following privatization.
Finally, it should also include the change in net government receipts (or reduced subsidies)
from the time that the privatization was announced until the privatization itself. Note that ΔPS
does not necessarily measure the change in the entity’s profit due to privatization. Profits
before privatization are part of GS. If an entity were profitable before and after privatization,
then privatization would increase ΔPS and reduce ΔGS, even if there were no change in profit.
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The change in ES should include changes in producer surplus (rents) gained (or lost) by
employees of the corporation or third-party persons, such as consultants and investment
bankers. Unions have often argued that the increased profits of privatization come at the
expense of lower salaries. Such effects would raise PS and lower ES. Furthermore, laid-off
workers may not find jobs that pay as well, they may experience periods of unemployment
before finding another job, or they may incur transaction costs in finding a new job. Each of
these factors would lower ES, especially during periods of low overall economic growth.
Severance benefits would increase ES but would, of course, reduce GS.
Another potential impact of privatization is the hollowing out of corporate skills, especially if
the entity is sold to a foreign-owned firm, but even if it is not. Conceptually, these impacts can
also be considered as reductions in ES. This issue came to the fore in the proposed takeover of
Potash Corp by BHP Billiton (although this occurred quite a few years after the privatization).
Unknown to many, Potash Corp’s senior management had effectively relocated from Saskatoon
to Chicago. When a firm moves its headquarters, it tends to employ consultants, lawyers and
accountants who are located nearby. In the Potash Corp case, there was almost certainly a loss
of some highly paid Canadian jobs. During the takeover battle, BHP promised to relocate the
headquarters back to Saskatoon. In order to garner political support to block the takeover,
Potash Corp had to promise to match this offer. Globally, a number of takeovers and
privatizations have been similarly affected by the hollowing-out issue. One company might be
large enough to create or destroy a cluster of professional services of critical mass. If it moves
away, it will have negative externality effects on complementary organizations in the affected
region.
In practice, the shadow multipliers (weights) in equation (2) are often set equal to unity.
However, many scholars argue that this is an incorrect weighting.15 Arbitrarily, one shadow
price multiplier is set equal to unity — usually λc, the shadow price of consumption. Unless
there is reason to weight employees differently from other people, the shadow price of
employment is also set equal to unity. Whether or not it is also appropriate to set the shadow
price of private investment funds equal to unity depends on the discount rate method that is
used. Boardman, Moore and Vining16 argue that the appropriate social discount method is to
weight flows in and out of the private sector by the shadow price of capital, and then discount
all flows at a consumption rate of interest. Following that method, one sets λp equal to the
shadow price of capital.17 The shadow multiplier on government revenue, λg, should reflect the
fact that raising government revenue through taxation typically involves a reduction in
allocative efficiency, which is referred to as the deadweight loss of taxation, and depends on
the marginal excess tax burden. There is a benefit (avoided loss) from obtaining government
revenue from the sale of a government entity, rather than through the imposition of incremental
income taxes. Thus, it makes sense to set λg equal to one plus the marginal excess tax burden.
15 Boardman, A.E., D.H. Greenberg, A.R. Vining and D.L. Weimer, 2011, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and
Practice, 4th ed., Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
16 Boardman, A.E., M.A. Moore and A.R. Vining, 2010, “The Social Discount Rate for Canada Based on Future
Growth in Consumption,” Canadian Public Policy, 36 (3), 323-341. 
17 We estimate the shadow price of capital is about 1.1 and suggest that the consumption rate of interest should be 3.5
percent based on the optimal growth rate method. Other analysts would set λp equal to unity and would use a higher
discount rate — on the order of about 8 percent.
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The aggregate change in social welfare also depends on who has standing.18 In the context of
Canadian federal privatizations, standing most naturally pertains to all residents of Canada, but
one could take a global perspective on standing, that is, one could include the impacts on
everyone on the planet. The decision on standing is important because it usually affects some
of the estimated surpluses. In particular, ΔPS depends on whether the actual profits following
privatization are higher or lower than expected and on the residency of the net shareholders. If
profits exceed expectations, but Canadians do not own the privatized firm at that time, they
will not benefit directly from the high profits. For provincial privatizations, analysis could be
conducted at the provincial, federal or global levels. If it is conducted at the provincial level,
negative or positive externalities borne outside the privatizing province would not be included
in the analysis.
Expected Social Welfare Effects of Privatizations
Both theory and evidence suggest that the social welfare effects of privatization depend
considerably on the market structure, both pre- and post-privatization. In markets that are
reasonably competitive, both pre-privatization and post-privatization, property rights theory
and agency theory predicts that profitability would increase significantly following
privatization.19 These hypotheses have been largely supported by empirical evidence, both
globally and in Canada.20 In reasonably competitive markets, we would expect that the increase
in profit, roughly reflected by the increase in PS minus the reduction in GS, would dominate
the other terms in equation (2), leading to increased social welfare. Furthermore, increased
profits would lead to increased corporate taxes and an increase in GS, with a further increase in
social welfare. Part of any increase in profits might come at the expense of a reduction in ES;
however, the change in ES is likely to be much smaller than the change in profits. If the entity
is in a competitive market, employees are likely to be paid competitive wage rates. Also, the
change in CS is likely to be small because output prices are set competitively. In sum,
therefore, in competitive markets, the change in social welfare is likely to be dominated by the
change in profits. In such situations one can reasonably use profitability and some other
measures (such as employment and taxes paid) as proxies for the change in social welfare.  
18 Whittington, D. and D. MacRae, 1996, “The Issue of Standing in Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 5(4), 1-18. 
19 De Alessi, L., 1980, “The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence” in R. Zerbe (ed.), Research in
Law and Economics, Vol. 2. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1-47; Fama, E.F. and M.C. Jensen, 1983, “Separation of
Ownership and Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-26.
20 Boardman, A.E. and A.R. Vining, 1989, “Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments:  A Comparison
of the Performance of Private, Mixed and State-Owned Enterprises,” Journal of Law and Economics, 32(1), 1-33;
Vining, A.R. and A.E. Boardman, 1992, “Ownership Versus Competition: The Causes of Government Enterprise
Inefficiency,” Public Choice 73(2), 205-239; D’Souza, J. and W.L. Megginson, 1999, “The Financial and Operating
Performance of Privatized Firms During the 1990s,” Journal of Finance, 54 (4), 1397-1438; Megginson, W.L. and
J.M. Netter, 2001, “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 39(2), 403-52; Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, and A.R. Vining, 2002, “Privatization in Canada: Operating
and Stock Price Performance with International Comparisons”, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 19 (2),
137-154.
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Theory is ambiguous on the welfare consequences of privatization when the entity operates in
a market that is not competitive.21 The expected welfare changes would depend on the
particular institutional and regulatory environment following privatization and on the extent of
any government failure following privatization.22 The net effect of the interplay of these factors
is hard to determine ex ante, especially as changes in the regulatory framework frequently
occur at the same time that privatization occurs. Some evidence suggests that improvements in
welfare do occur in non-competitive markets in developed countries.23
4. THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION IN CANADA
The previous section has outlined the theoretically correct way to assess the social welfare
effects of privatization. In Canada, only one study24 has performed a comprehensive welfare
analysis along these lines. We, therefore, begin this section with a summary of this study. After
that we turn to the use of proxies and measures of operational performance in SIPs. We then
consider the performance of SIPs for which there are no quantitative performance data. Finally,
we briefly discuss the impact of privatization on DSPs.
Social Welfare Gains from the CNR Privatization
A study in which the present authors participated25 examined the social welfare gains from the
privatization of Canadian National Railway (CNR), one of the largest rail privatizations
globally.  A unique feature of their study was that it used the costs of Canadian Pacific Railway
(CPR) to estimate CNR’s costs if it had not been privatized. This method produces a superior
counterfactual to those used in other privatization studies.  
21 Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow, 1991, “Economic Perspectives on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (2),
111-132; Foster, C., 1992 Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell; Martin, S. and D. Parker, 1995, “Privatization and Economic Performance throughout the UK Business
Cycle,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 16(3), 225-237; Bradburb, R., 1996, “Privatization of Natural
Monopoly Public Enterprises: The Regulation Issue,” Review of Industrial Organization, 10 (3), 247-267; Newbery,
D. and M. Pollitt, 1997, “The Restructuring and Privatization of Britain’s CEGB—Was It Worth It?” Journal of
Industrial Economics, 45(3), 269-303.
22 Datta-Chaudhuri, M., 1990, “Market Failure and Government Failure,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (3), 25-
39; Winston, C., 2006, Government Failure versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research and
Government Performance, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press; Weimer, D. and A. R. Vining, 2010, Policy
Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
23 Domah, P. and M.G. Pollitt, 2001, “The Restructuring and Privatisation of the Electricity Distribution and Supply
Businesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis”, Fiscal Studies, 22(1), 107-146. The empirical
findings are more variable both in developing countries (see Boubakri, N., J-C. Cosset and O. Guedhami, 2005,
“Liberalization, Corporate Governance and the Performance of Privatized Firms in Developing Countries,” Journal
of Corporate Finance, 11(5), 767-790) and in transition economies (see Estrin, S., J. Hanousek, E. Kocenda and J.
Svejnar, 2009, “The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 47(3), 699-728).
24 Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, M.A. Moore and A.R. Vining, 2009, op. cit.
25 Op. cit.
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In our base case analysis, we argued that the privatization of CNR had a minimal effect on
market prices, output levels or quality and, therefore, that the change in CS was minimal. We
further argued that there were no significant changes to employee numbers or salaries due to
privatization and therefore, the effects on ES were minimal. Finally, we argued that the impacts
on competitors or on companies upstream or downstream were also minimal. Consequently,
our analysis of welfare impacts focused on the cost-efficiency improvements that could be
attributed to the privatization.
We found that during the four-year period immediately prior to the change in management at
CNR (1988 through 1991), CNR’s real average total cost (ATC) per revenue-tonne kilometre
of freight shipped was 6.66 percent higher than CPR’s ATC during the same period. Assuming
that this cost differential would continue if CNR were not privatized and using CPR’s actual
costs, the authors constructed a counterfactual for CNR’s ATCs for the 1993-2003 period.
CNR’s actual costs were subtracted from these counterfactual costs to obtain an estimate of the
annual ATC savings. This difference was multiplied by CNR’s actual volumes to obtain
estimates of the annual (total) cost savings. Finally, these amounts were converted to real
dollars and discounted using a real social discount rate of 3.5 percent. We estimate that the
present value of the cost savings due to privatization was just over $3 billion (in 1992 dollars)
for the 1993-2003 period. Projecting the future savings beyond 2003 and discounting these
amounts back to the year of privatization yielded $12 billion in additional cost savings. Thus,
we estimate the total welfare gain from the privatization of CNR was about $15 billion.
This welfare gain was shared between shareholders and the government. Government received
the sale proceeds of almost $2 billion and additional tax revenue following privatization of
about $6 billion. The hardest component to estimate was the foregone profits under
government ownership from the time of privatization. We provide a range of values with a
mid-point of about $1 billion. Aggregating these components implies that the change in GS
was about $7 billion, as shown in Table 3.26 By subtraction, and assuming that the λs equal
one, the change in producer surplus was about $8 billion. As Table 3 also shows, most of that
surplus accrued to foreigners because they were long-term shareholders.
TABLE 3: THE WELFARE GAINS DUE TO THE PRIVATIZATION OF CNR AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION
(MILLIONS OF 1992$)
a CNR’s average unit costs = 1.066*CPR’s average unit costs in each year
b CNR’s average unit costs fall 1.062 percent/year faster than CPR’s average unit costs
Source: Adapted from Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, M.A. Moore and A.R. Vining, 2009, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the
Privatization of Canadian National Railway,” Canadian Public Policy, 35 (1), 59-83.
26 In addition, the federal government received about $80 million of additional profit during the pre-privatization
(commercialization) period of 1993-95, and capital gains taxes of approximately $70 million from the sale of the
underpriced shares. It also incurred transaction costs associated with the sale of about $73 million.
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Base-Case Counterfactual
a
15,056 6,901 8,155 3,692 4,463 10,593
Conservative Counterfactual
b
4,346 2,296 2,051 945 1,106 3,241
ΔW ΔGS ΔPS ΔPSCanadian ΔPSForeign ΔWCanadian
In fact, CNR’s cost disadvantage relative to CPR decreased during the 1980s, prior to
commercialization-privatization. Specifically, CNR’s ATC fell on average by 1.062 percent per
year faster than CPR’s ATC between 1981 and 1991. Consequently, we calculated a
conservative counterfactual for CNR’s ATCs assuming that CNR’s ATCs in 1993 equalled
CNR’s actual ATC in 1992, times CPR’s rate of decrease in ATC for 1992-1993, minus
1.062 percent. CNR’s counterfactual ATC in each subsequent year through 2003 was based on
a similar formula. Based on this conservative counterfactual, we estimated that CNR’s
privatization generated welfare gains of about $4 billion in aggregate (in 1992 dollars). As
Table 3 shows, the federal government captured just over half of this amount.
Operational Performance and Proxies of Social Welfare Changes in SIPs
The previous section illustrates that obtaining a theoretically correct estimate of the change in
social welfare following a privatization is demanding. Rarely are appropriate data available.
Importantly, however, it is sometimes possible to use proxies for CS, PS, GS and ES. Most
importantly, measures of technical efficiency and profitability are indicative of the net change
in PS plus GS, excluding transaction costs and taxes. Changes in employment provide some
information about changes in ES. Furthermore, changes in taxes paid are an important
component of GS. Thus, examination of measures of technical efficiency, profitability,
employment and taxes provide qualitative and quantitative (although not monetized)
information about changes in social welfare. 
This sub-section examines the pre-privatization and post-privatization operating performance
of Canadian SIPs. It builds upon our earlier analysis27 but it extends this work in three major
ways. First, it includes two more privatizations, namely SaskOil and MTS, resulting in 11 SIPs.
Second, it extends the data backward up to five years pre-privatization (rather than three years)
and extends the data forward to up to 2009 (rather than only three years post-privatization),
whenever possible. Third, it primarily uses Compustat data.28 These changes improve the
reliability and robustness of the earlier results. 
For the complete sample of 11 firms, we have data for two years pre-privatization and three
years post-privatization. As we extend our analysis further backwards or further forwards, the
number of firms declines due to unavailability of data (e.g., FPI), the occurrence of mergers or
acquisitions (SaskOil and Petro-Canada), or because the entity was privatized relatively
recently (especially MTS, but also CNR and others). There are data for seven firms for up to
17 years post-privatization (Air Canada, Potash Corp., Telus, Petro-Canada, Cameco, Suncor
and Emera). After that, it is no longer reasonable to compute measures of average operating
performance. 
27 Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, and A.R. Vining, 2002, op. cit.
28 Some early data for Potash Corporation and some later data for Air Canada come from the annual reports in SEDAR.
Some data around the time of privatization of FPI, Air Canada, Petro-Canada and for all years for MTS were taken
from the hard copies of the annual reports.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SIPS
SaskOil was the first SIP in our sample to be privatized. It was established in 1973 as a crown
corporation to explore for oil and natural gas in Saskatchewan, extract these products and
market them. It also provided a window on the industry. The majority of the shares were sold
in a public offering in 1986. In 1996, its name was changed to Wascana Energy and in 1997 it
was acquired by Canadian Occidental, a publicly traded Canadian company. In 2000, Canadian
Occidental was renamed Nexen. Currently, Nexen has assets of $22 billion and reported a
profit of about $6 billion in 2010.
For FPI, we can only go back two years pre-privatization and go forward for three years post-
privatization. FPI suffered enormously from the collapse of the cod fishery on the East Coast.
However, it managed to survive and in December 2007, FPI’s Manufacturing and Marketing
Group was taken over by High Liner Foods Inc., formerly National Sea Products.  
For the other nine companies we have data from three years prior to privatization (except
Emera) until 2009 or, in the case of Petro-Canada, until it merged with Suncor. Most of these
firms have made acquisitions following privatization. After an extended takeover battle, Air
Canada took over Canadian Airlines in 2001. Telus, which was initially Alberta Government
Telephones, merged with BC Tel (technically BC Telecom) in 1999 to become Canada’s
second-largest telephone company. Subsequently, Telus acquired ED Tel in 1990 and the
QuebecTel Group in 2000. Nova Scotia Power acquired Bangor-Hydro Electric in 2000. CNR
acquired the Illinois Central Railroad in 1998 for $2.4 billion US and began integrating those
operations in 1999. It then acquired Wisconsin Central for $1.2 billion US in 2001, Great
Lakes Transportation for $380 million US in 2003 and BC Rail for $1 billion in 2003.  
OVERVIEW OF CHANGES IN OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Table 4 presents a summary of the operating performance before and after privatization on a
number of measures and the changes in these measures. All variables that were originally
measured in nominal dollars have been converted to real 1983 dollars using the Canadian CPI.
For convenience, we drop the term “real” in this sub-section. 
TABLE 4: PRE AND POST-PRIVATIZATION OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF SIPS
*All data in millions of dollars or a percentage except where noted.
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Real Sales 1,455 1,426 1,336 1,442 2,974 -91 -13 1,520
Real Assets 2,395 2,335 2,300 2,686 5,308 -35 291 2,913
Real CAPEX 196 186 240 270 555 54 74 359
CAPEX to Sales 19.3% 17.9% 23.5% 23.9% 20.6% 5.6% 4.6% 1.3%
CAPEX to Assets 8.8% 8.3% 10.2% 10.5% 9.9% 2.0% 1.7% 1.1%
Number of Employees (actual number) 10,614 9,245 7,809 7,608 9,274 -1,437 -3,005 -1,340
Real Sales per Employee ($1000s) 199 218 229 262 462 11 63 263
Real Net Income 18 17 69 82 222 52 64 204
Net Income to Sales (ROS) 4.3% 6.0% 8.7% 9.0% 8.6% 2.6% 4.7% 4.3%
Net Income to Assets (ROA) 2.3% 2.9% 3.4% 3.4% 3.3% 0.5% 1.1% 1.0%
Real Dividends 19 17 35 40 69 18 21 50
Dividends to Sales 1.9% 1.7% 4.8% 4.7% 3.9% 3.1% 2.8% 2.1%
Real Taxes 29 29 47 64 158 18 35 129
Debt to Assets 55.4% 56.1% 45.1% 47.3% 55.4% -11.0% -8.1% 0.0%
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
5 Years 3 Years 3 Years 5 Years 17 Years Change: 3 Change: 5 Change: 5
Before Before After After After years before years before years before
& 3 after & 5 after & 17 after
In the three-year period following privatization, net income, capital expenditures (CAPEX),
dividends, taxes, taxes-to-sales and sales per employee increased, on average, and continued to
increase throughout the 17-year post-privatization period. Again examining the averages, some
variables decreased in the years immediately following privatization and then increased
throughout the post-privatization period: sales, assets, liabilities and income per employee. The
average debt-to-assets ratio followed the same pattern, but never reached pre-privatization
levels in the post-privatization period. The average number of employees decreased for five
years following privatization and then started to increase, lagging earlier increases in sales and
assets. Profitability, as measured by return on sales (ROS) and return on assets (ROA),
increased post-privatization, but did not continue to increase beyond the initial five years
following privatization. The average CAPEX expressed as a percentage of sales or assets and
the average dividends-to-sales ratio increased soon after privatization, but then remained
constant or declined slightly. Average net income per employee did not change much following
privatization, but subsequently increased considerably. We now discuss the measures of
operating performance in more detail.
GROWTH AND INVESTMENT
While firm growth is not a direct measure of social welfare, growth may enable increases in
profits, employment and taxes, which better reflect welfare. Consequently, we begin with an
analysis of sales and assets and then turn to CAPEX, which captures investment in the firm and
is a potential indicator of future profits. Again, we use real dollars. Finally, we examine the
CAPEX-to-sales and CAPEX-to-assets ratios. Another reason for examining sales is that they
may be indicative of the social purpose or political goals of crown corporations.29 Even though
the firms in our sample operated in competitive environments prior to privatization, for
political reasons they might have had more output (and sales) than would have been profit-
maximising. When privatized, their sales would fall in the short run. In the longer run, pressure
for profits might well lead to increased sales. Thus we expect a U-shaped relationship over
time.
As expected, sales were lower (by $90 million in real dollars per year) in the three years post-
privatization than in the three years pre-privatization. Also, as expected, sales increased
afterwards. In fact, sales decreased from $1.70 billion per year on average five years prior to
privatization to $1.32 billion per year, on average, in the first year following privatization.
Since then, average sales have increased in every year. By the 17th year post-privatization,
sales averaged over $7 billion per year in 1983 dollars ($11 billion per year in nominal
dollars). In terms of individual firms, Suncor produced the largest average increase in sales
following privatization of over $4 billion per year. Potash Corp produced the biggest increase
in sales in percentage terms: sales averaged $240 million per year prior to privatization, but
over $1.6 billion following privatization. Nova Scotia Power generated the smallest increase in
sales following privatization. 
29 Zif, J., 1981, “Managerial Strategic Behavior in State-Owned Enterprises-Business and Political Orientations,”
Management Science, 27:11, 1326-39.
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Assets decreased in the five years prior to privatization to just over $2 billion in real dollars, on
average, in the year of privatization. After that, assets increased steadily. By the 17th year,
assets averaged over $13 billion, which amounts to an average increase of almost 12 percent
per annum. Suncor generated the largest increase in assets following privatization: its assets
increased by 2,785 percent (21.9 percent per annum on average), with much of that increase
attributable to its merger with Petro-Canada. Other privatizations with strong asset growth
included SaskOil, Potash Corp, CNR, Petro-Canada, Cameco and Telus.
On average, CAPEX increased 11.9 percent per annum following privatization, which is a very
similar rate to the rate of increase in assets. There were, however, large differences across
firms. Potash Corp and Suncor had the largest average increase in CAPEX post-privatization.
Suncor and Petro-Canada have, on average, spent almost $1.5 billion per year on CAPEX since
privatization. Telus, CNR and Air Canada have also incurred large expenditures, averaging
between $450 million per year and $820 million per year. In contrast, CAPEX declined
following privatization at Emera and FPI. 
The average CAPEX-to-sales ratio was higher prior to privatization for Canadian SIPs than for
SIPs in other industrialized countries and it increased more in Canada than other countries
following privatization.30 The average CAPEX-to-sales ratio was almost five percentage points
higher in the five years following privatization than in the five years prior to privatization.
After that, the ratio fell back to a level similar to the pre-privatization level. There were,
however, substantial differences across companies. Following privatization, the CAPEX-to-
sales ratio was high (over 30 percent on average) for SaskOil and Suncor. On the other hand, it
fell following privatization for Nova Scotia Power, Potash Corp, MTS, Telus and FPI. The
CAPEX-to-assets ratio provides a similar picture, although the ratios are naturally smaller.
In conclusion, there were large reductions in sales and assets during the pre-privatization
period. Soon after privatization, however, sales, assets and CAPEX increased on average and
continued to increase throughout the 17-year post-privatization period. Furthermore, CAPEX
increased as a percentage of sales or assets for about five years following privatization from an
initially high level, relative to SIPs in other industrialized countries.
EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE SURPLUS
Employment in crown corporations might have been higher than the profit-maximizing levels
for social or political reasons. The removal of these socio-political pressures and a concomitant
increased emphasis on efficiency and profitability would lead to a fall in employment
following privatization. Reduced employment might in turn reduce ES. However, as we
discussed above in the welfare analysis of CNR, employment might fall without any major
change in ES. 
In fact, the average number of employees decreased significantly in the five-year period prior
to privatization and continued to decrease for five years following privatization. Average
employment decreased from over 16,000 people five years prior to privatization to just over
7,000 people in the fifth year following privatization. Since then, average employment
increased to over 12,000 people in the 17th year, still below the pre-privatization level.  
30 Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, and A.R. Vining, 2002, op. cit.
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Petro-Canada and CNR now have more than 30 percent fewer employees than they had in the
three-year pre-privatization period, while Emera has 24 percent fewer employees. On the other
hand, Telus was the main contributor to the increase in employment: it added over 10,000
employees as a result of its merger with BC Tel in 1999, and its number of employees has
continued to increase. With over 36,000 employees, it is currently the largest employer in the
sample. Potash Corp and Cameco have had the largest percentage increase from three years
prior to privatization until last year — 186 percent and 90 percent, respectively. Air Canada has
exhibited the most variability. It shed almost 3,000 employees during the first five years of
privatization, but then gained about 10,000 employees when it merged with Canadian Airlines
in 1999. Since then, Air Canada has been reducing employees. It now has only slightly more
employees than it had five years prior to privatization.
The drop in employment in the five-year pre-privatization period and the three-year post-
privatization period was dramatic. Other industrial countries also reduced their employment
levels following privatization, but the reduction by Canadian firms was a much larger
percentage change.31 However, after many of these companies restructured, which took about
five years following privatization, hiring began again. As documented in our analysis32 of
CNR, many of the reductions in employment were voluntary and many would probably have
occurred anyway due to competitive pressures. 
EFFICIENCY, PROFIT, PROFITABILITY, DIVIDENDS AND PRODUCER SURPLUS
We begin with a discussion of operational efficiency, measured by sales per employee, because
it is a good indicator of success. We then turn to accounting profits (net income). Over the long
run, we would expect accounting profits to be positively correlated with economic profits and
producer surplus. Investors, however, tend to focus on returns. Therefore, measures of
profitability, such as ROA and ROS, are also useful. Finally, we examine dividends, in absolute
terms and again as a percentage of sales and assets. Changes in dividends are an important
determinant of changes in returns to shareholders and are directly related to producer surplus.
As we have discussed above, in the one to five-year period following privatization, (real) sales
were increasing and employment was decreasing. Consequently, average sales per employee
was increasing during that period. Prior to that period, sales and employment were both
decreasing, and after that period sales and employment were both increasing. From this
information alone, it is not clear whether sales per employee was increasing or decreasing
during these periods. In fact, the average sales per employee rate was slightly higher in the
three-year post-privatization period than in the three-year pre-privatization period. After that,
the average sales per employee increased in almost every year. By the 17th year post-
privatization, it averaged $873,000 per employee, which is 340 percent higher than in the
three-year pre-privatization period (equivalent to a 9.1 percent per-annum increase on average).
In fact, sales per employee increased at all the privatized firms following privatization.
Petro-Canada generated the most impressive improvement, increasing its real sales per
employee from $405,000 in the year of privatization to almost $3 million 17 years later. Telus,
Emera, Air Canada and MTS have had the most difficulty improving sales per employee, with
real average annual increases in the range of 2.65 percent to 3.65 percent. Overall, though,
there have been large improvements in operational efficiency following privatization.
31 Op. cit.
32 Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin, M.A. Moore and A.R. Vining, 2009, op. cit.
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During the three years prior to privatization, the real net income (NI) of the SIPs averaged
$17 million. Petro-Canada, Suncor and CNR all took large write-downs during this period.
Post-privatization, NI for the full cohort increased fairly consistently, reaching over $600
million per year, on average, in the 17th year. There were a number of particularly noteworthy
increases in NI. CNR moved from an average three-year pre-privatization loss of $223 million
per year to an average 14-year post-privatization profit of $718 million per year. CNR’s NI is
currently over $1 billion per year. Both Petro-Canada and Suncor increased their average post-
privatization NI by over $500 million. Potash Corp produced exceptional profits in 2008 (over
$2 billion in real dollars), but has only averaged a NI of $278 million per year following
privatization. On the other hand, Air Canada has lost an average of $412 million per year since
privatization. In 2003, it lost over $3.5 billion (over $5 billion in nominal dollars).
On average, profitability, as measured by ROS and ROA, was considerably higher post-
privatization than it was pre-privatization. However, this apparent improvement came about
because, as mentioned above, some companies (especially Potash Corp and CNR) took
significant write-offs in the pre-privatization period. Nonetheless, the ROS for both of these
companies post privatization has been impressive: it has been over 20 percent for the past
five years for CNR and has averaged over 12 percent for Potash Corp since privatization.
Cameco, MTS and Emera have also generated high post-privatization ROS. Air Canada has
had some large losses following privatization and has had an average post-privatization ROS
of -6.6 percent and post-privatization ROA of -8.2 percent. Telus also had a lower ROS post-
privatization than pre-privatization, although this is not surprising. It absorbed BC Tel and
other acquisitions. Furthermore, it operated in a regulated industry that has been undergoing
major structural changes and has experienced increased competition. Both SaskOil and FPI
also had lower ROS following privatization. In summary, profitability increased on average in
the first few years following privatization, but not thereafter. There were, however, significant
differences across companies.
Increasing profits and increasing profitability might be expected to lead to increasing (real)
dividends. On average, dividends were low prior to privatization and, in fact, decreased slightly
prior to privatization. They averaged $17 million per year during the three-year pre-
privatization period. In the year of privatization, the average dividend increased to $36 million,
largely because of a $96 million dividend paid by Potash Corp and a $75 million dividend paid
by SaskOil. Dividends remained at about that level ($35 million per year on average), for the
three-year post-privatization period, about $18 million per year higher than prior to
privatization. Thereafter, the average dividends increased regularly. By the end of the 17th year
after privatization, dividends averaged $138 million per year, equivalent to an average (real)
annual increase of 8.2 percent. Telus and CNR have provided the most dividends, followed by
Suncor and Petro-Canada. This evidence suggests rising PS.
TAXES AND GOVERNMENT SURPLUS
Our one distinct indicator of GS is the amount of corporate taxes paid. Prior to privatization,
(real) corporate taxes averaged about $29 million per year. In the three-year post-privatization
period, corporate taxes rose to $47 million per year, an increase of about $18 million per year.
After that period, taxes increased consistently; they amounted to over $300 million in the 17th
year following privatization on average. Petro-Canada has been the largest payer of taxes by
far, averaging over $600 million per year since privatization. CNR and Suncor have paid the
next highest amount on average, followed by Telus. In contrast, SaskOil, FPI and Air Canada
have paid virtually no tax.  
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DEBT-TO-ASSETS
Finally, we discuss capital structure. It has little direct bearing on social welfare, but is of
theoretical interest. We expect that debt (relative to assets) would decrease following
privatization for two reasons. First, reduced or eliminated government ownership will increase
the cost of debt. Second, the firm will have direct access to capital markets and will find it
easier to raise equity. In the longer run, the debt-to-assets ratio might increase as profitability
increases, risk is reduced and banks become more willing to lend to these entities.
In fact, the debt-to-assets ratio decreased considerably following privatization by 11 percent,
on average, from 56 percent in the three-year pre-privatization period to 45 percent in the first
three-year post-privatization period. In the fourth year post-privatization, the average debt-to-
assets level rose to 51 percent and it has been at that level or higher ever since. A major
contributor to the high level is Air Canada, whose debt-to-assets ratio has been as high as
160 percent, but is now trending down.
SIPs with No Quantitative Performance Data
It is worth briefly discussing SIPs for which we have no hard data. Alberta Energy Company
(AEC), Co-enerco, BCRIC and CDC all fall into this category. We did not include AEC in the
dataset because it was privatized in 1975, only two years after it became fully operational.
Thus, it is not really practical to perform a pre- vs. post-privatization comparison. However,
AEC appears to have performed well following its privatization and, by 1995, it had become
the second-largest oil and gas producer in Canada. In December 1995, AEC acquired Conwest
Exploration Company for $1.1 billion and in 2002 it merged with PanCanadian to form
ENCANA. For the same reason, we did not include Co-enerco, which was acquired by
Pennzoil in 1994, only two years after the first public offering. 
BCRIC was an unusual privatization. Prior to privatization, it was a conglomerate that held a
variety of natural resource companies, most of which had been bailed out by the BC
government. BCRIC was privatized in a giveaway: every resident of BC received five shares.33
Few people sold their shares because they were worth little and the transactions costs of selling
(or buying) shares were relatively high. As a result, share ownership was dispersed, there was
no effective shareholder control and management was not held accountable. Soon after
privatization, BCRIC changed its name to the Westar Group Ltd., after one of its subsidiaries.
It expanded into unprofitable businesses, and lost considerable amounts of money. There was a
125-for-1 share consolidation and in 1997, the remaining parts of the company were acquired
by the Jim Pattison Group. This privatization experience suggests problems with excessive
share ownership dispersal and lack of appropriate corporate governance. Also, obviously,
government received no revenue from the privatization.
CDC was a mixed enterprise, with a combination of private and government shareholders. It
was intended to foster wider share ownership, to encourage large-scale development projects
and to maximize profits. It was a conglomerate with holdings in oil and gas, mining,
petrochemicals, office information products, life sciences, industrial information and venture
capital, all reasonably competitive industries. Boardman and Vining34 analyzed its financial  
33 Ohashi, T.M., 1980, Privatization, Theory and Practice: Distributing Shares in Private and Public Enterprises,
Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute.
34 Boardman, A.E. and A.R. Vining, 1984, “An Evaluation of Canada Development Corporation,” Working Paper, UBC
Faculty of Commerce.
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performance between 1973 and 1983 and conclude that its performance was inferior to
comparable private-sector Canadian companies. CDC was largely privatized in 1985 and
subsequently broken up. 
Post Privatization Performance of DSPs
When DSPs are sold, they are usually integrated into already existing businesses. It is
impossible to access data that allows us to assess the post-privatization performance of such
companies. Table 5 summarizes the current status of these entities, as best we know. Most of
the purchasing companies appear to be still operating profitably, except Transport Route
Canada Inc. and Nortel.
TABLE 5: CURRENT STATUS OF MAJOR DIRECT SALE PRIVATIZATIONS
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Northern Transportation Company Ltd.
de Havilland Aircraft Canada Ltd.
Pêcheries Canada Inc.           
Canadian Arsenals Ltd.
Nanisivik Mines
CN Route
Canadair Ltd.
Northern Canada Power Commission (Yukon)
Teleglobe Canada
CN Hotels (CN Subsidiary)
Northwest Tel Inc. (CN Subsidiary)
Terra Nova Telecommunications Inc. 
CNCP Telecom and Telecom Term Sys
Nordion International Inc.
Telesat Canada 
CN Short line in Nova Scotia
CN Exploration (CN Subsidiary)
Canarctic Shipping Company 
Canada Communication Group 
National Sea Products Ltd.
Theratronics International Ltd.
AECL’s Commercial Division
Provincial DSPs
Prince Albert Pulp Company
Donohue Inc.
SOQUIP Alberta
BC Hydro’s mainland natural gas division
SaskPower's oil and gas business
Manitoba Forestry Resources Ltd.
Novatel’s systems business
Novatel’s cellular telephone manufacturing
Alberta Liquor Control Board Stores (ALCB)
Syncrude Canada
Vencap Equities Alberta
Ontario Power Generation-4 Hydroelectric Stations
Skeena Cellulose
A subsidiary of NorTerra Inc.
Absorbed into Bombardier.
Unknown
Absorbed into SNC-Lavalin.
Absorbed into MRI.
Sold to Transport Route Canada Inc., which was bankrupt in 1988
Absorbed into Bombardier.
Absorbed into Yukon Power.
A division of Comtech EF Data.
Absorbed into Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd
Absorbed into BCE.
Part of Bell Aliant, currently 44% owned by Bell Canada.
Absorbed into Canadian Pacific
Became part of MDS Nordion.
Absorbed into BCE.
Sold to RailTex, a subsidiary of Rail America.
Absorbed into Devon Energy.
A subsidiary of Fednav Group
Part of St. Joseph Communications.
Acquired by Highliner.
Became part of MDS Nordion.
Absorbed into SNC-Lavalin.
Current Status
Absorbed into Weyerhauser.
Controlled by AbitibiBowater.
Absorbed into Canadian Natural Resources.
Part of Fortis BC.
Absorbed into SaskOil
Aquired by UPM-Kymmene Corp.
Sold to Nortel, which is in bankruptcy protection.
Absorbed into Telexel Holding Ltd
Sold to owner-licensees.
An on-going joint venture between seven private-sector companies
Absorbed into Onex.
Part of Brookfield Asset Management.
Unknown
Federal DSPs Current Status
One exception is provided by the privatization of (ACLB) retail stores, which West35 has
analysed comprehensively, and from which we draw here. Following privatization, consumer
surplus increased for three main reasons. First, there was a large increase in the number of
liquor stores, which improved accessibility. Second, there was a large increase in warehouse
product selection. Third, average real retail prices were lower in December 2000 than prior to
privatization, although they rose initially (until about January 1996). Given these changes, one
might expect quantities would have increased, but they did not. The change in government
surplus (i.e., government revenue) following privatization was small by design: the Alberta
government intended that privatization should be revenue-neutral. As part of its privatization,
the ACLB released 1,866 employees (of which 1,394 worked in the stores, equivalent to about
950 full-time equivalents (FTEs)), many of whom were earning near the top of the union pay
scale rate of $14.39 per hour. West36 estimates that there were 2,904 FTEs working in liquor
stores in early 1996 and that there were possibly 6,000 employees in December 2001. Wages,
however, fell considerably following privatization. In February 1996, the average wage paid in
a liquor store was $7.19, much less than the top end of the union pay scale in 1993 of $14.39
and less than liquor store wages in Ontario or BC, which exceed $17 per hour. Thus, there was
probably some lost employee surplus. 
Overall Conclusion on Performance Following Privatization
Our overall conclusion is that the privatization of entities operating in competitive markets has
been social welfare-improving. Indeed, our major policy conclusion is that this kind of
privatization is a no-brainer. The evidence for this conclusion is clear, strong and convincing in
the case of SIPs, while it is mostly inferential in the case of DSPs. Most SIPs did well in terms of
operational efficiency improvement and increase in profitability, and also paid significant taxes.
The only two privatized entities that might be considered as failures are FPI and Air Canada. FPI
obviously suffered with the collapse of the cod fishery. Air Canada operates in a cyclical and
often unprofitable industry. Due to structural conditions, it was hard to effect efficiencies
following privatization. If it had remained as a crown corporation it might have performed worse.
In no case did the government end-up renationalizing a privatized entity. The only corporation
that was partially re-acquired by government was de Havilland Aircraft Canada, which was
sold by the federal government to Boeing in 1986 and was jointly bought by the Ontario
government and Bombardier in early 1992. However, the Ontario government did not maintain
its ownership for long and it was fully sold to Bombardier later in 1992.
35 West, D, 2003, The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta, Vancouver, B.C.: The Fraser Institute Digital
Publication available at http://www.fraserinstitute.org/research-news/display.aspx?id=13530, accessed 15 Nov 2011.
36 Op. cit.
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5. POTENTIAL FUTURE PRIVATIZATIONS
Despite the overall success of Canadian privatizations, much of the Canadian economy remains
in state hands. There are still many federal and provincial crown corporations.37 In addition,
health care, water, sewage treatment and many other municipal services are still provided by
government. These sectors contain potential candidates for privatization.
Table 6 contains a list of federal crown corporations that might be privatized in whole or in
part. It also provides some information about these corporations’ commercial revenues, net
income, parliamentary appropriations, expenses, debt obligations, total assets, total liabilities
and a categorization variable, NSSB. As mentioned in the introduction, the Harper minority
government mooted the possibility of privatizing the seven crown corporations from this list as
indicated by the last column (AECL was an eighth). However, at the same time, the
government characterized these crown corporations as “not self-sustaining” (NSSB).
TABLE 6: FEDERAL CROWN CORPORATIONS THAT MIGHT BE PRIVATIZED, 2009
All figures in $ millions
Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2010, Annual Report to Parliament: Crown Corporations and Other Corporate
Interests of Canada 2010 (available at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/reports-rapports/cc-se/2010/cc-setb-eng.asp.) p. 21,
22, 23, 26, 28, 29 and Mayeda, A., “Major Canadian Government Assets could be Sold,” Canwest News Service,
February 17, 2009. 
NSSB identified as “not self-sustaining” business
We have not compiled a similar table for provincial crown corporations, although there are
some obvious potential privatization candidates. Some sectors that might be privatized in
whole or in part include the electric power transmission and distribution providers (e.g., BC
Hydro), insurance companies (e.g., Insurance Corporation of BC, Manitoba Public Insurance,
Saskatchewan Public Insurance), financial services (e.g., ATB Financial), liquor retail outlets
and distribution (e.g., Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), BC Liquor Stores,
Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming), lottery corporations (e.g., Manitoba Lotteries Corporation,
BC Liquor Corporation) and ferry corporations (e.g., BC Ferries). Many of these organizations
are large and profitable.
37 McKenzie, K. and D. Crisan, 2011, “An Inventory and Database of Crown Corporations in Canada: Federal,
Provincial and Municipal,” Paper Presented at Public Performance and Privatization Rountable, University of Calgary. 
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Business Development Bank of Canada 6 0 13,732 17,680 14,037 No
Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation -102 1,965 1,108 No
Canada Development Investment Corporation 70 3,546 121 No
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation 931 2,613 252,047 272,821 263,558 No
Canada Post Corporation 281 23 6,029 4,213 No
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 566 1,143 1,700 Yes
Cape Breton Development Corp. 5 60 94 Yes
Export Development Canada 258 24,447 32,898 26,310 No
Federal Bridge Corp. Ltd. 15 31 43 Yes
National Arts Centre Corp. 26 41 66 Yes
Old Port of Montreal Corp. 17 15 32 Yes
Parc Downsview Park Inc. N/A N/A N/A Yes
Public Sector Pension Investment Board 7,513 49,037 2,768 No
VIA Rail Canada Inc. 294 3 338 506 997 222 Yes
TOTAL (all crown corporations) 6,666
Crown Corporation Commercial Net Parliamentary Expenses Debt Total Liabilities NSSB
Revenues Income Appropriation Assets
There are, of course, many barriers to privatization.38 In addition to political and bureaucratic
barriers, tax implications are sometimes a deterrent for provincial privatizations. First, crown
corporations cannot carry forward tax losses, which will reduce the sale price. Second,
privatized companies will pay taxes to the federal government, thereby reducing the aggregate
funds that will remain in the province.
Corporations often have a portfolio of different businesses. For example, Canada Post
Corporation (CPC) is in the businesses of both delivering regular mail and delivering packages
(it owns Purolator). These businesses operate in different markets (industries) with different
competitors and different structural conditions. Also, the socio-political mandates may differ by
business. The potential for privatization must be assessed for each business, not the corporation
as a whole. It might make sense to privatize some businesses operated by a particular crown
corporation, but not others.
Rather than analyzing each potential privatization, we think it makes more sense to develop
some general principles about their privatization. To begin, it is useful to categorize these
businesses (not crown corporations) into one of three groups: (1) those businesses that would
operate in competitive markets following privatization (competitive business: CB); (2) those
businesses that would have significant market power following privatization (market power
business: MPB); and (3) those businesses that would have significant revenue following
privatization, but which would not have positive cash flow if they are required to maintain their
public-purpose mandate after privatization, for example, a universal service mandate (non-
viable businesses: NVB).39
Crown corporations with little or no revenue would require on-going subsidies from
government for them to perform their current activities or mandate. They can be thought of as
belonging in a fourth category (uncompetitive businesses requiring subsidy). For reasons
explained earlier, these businesses might be corporatized. However, they would never be
privatized and would always be instruments of government policy, ultimately subject to
political direction.
It is beyond our scope to categorize the crown corporations in Table 6 into CBs, MPBs or
NVBs. That would require a detailed analysis of each corporation and the businesses within it.
As mentioned above, different businesses within each corporation may fit in different
categories. 
It is also beyond our scope to determine which businesses should be privatized. It would
require a case-by-case analysis to make such a determination, including a consideration of the
post-privatization regulatory and legislative framework. Instead, we propose some general
principles. 
38 See Bird, Malcolm, 2011, “The Residual Crowns: Institutional Change in the Post-Neoliberal Era,” Working paper,
Department of Politics, University of Winnipeg, for an analysis of four of these residual crown corporations (LCBO,
ATB Financial, VIA Rail and CPC) and an explanation of why they remained in the public sphere.
39 Crew, M.A. and P.R. Kleindorfer, 1998, “Efficient Entry, Monopoly, and the Universal Service Obligation in Postal
Service,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 14, 1998, 103-125; 2002, “Multi-National Policies for the Universal
Service Obligation in the Postal Sector under Entry,” Review of Network Economics, 7(2), 188-206.
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Meta-Rules for Future Canadian Privatizations
As far as we are aware, no Canadian government has formulated a framework to guide its
privatization regime. A clear normative framework is an important part of a privatization
program because the way in which an entity is privatized, and the nature of the post-
privatization regulatory environment, is likely to play an important role in determining the
social welfare consequences of its privatization. Based on the above considerations, we
propose some rules for government that are intended to maximize the probability that social
welfare will be maximized in each categorical situation. In this optimistic (naïve?) spirit, we
propose the following meta-rules: 
1. If a crown corporation has multiple businesses, it should be broken up into separate,
corporatized businesses prior to privatization. 
2. Government should privatize CBs. 
3. Direct or indirect subsidies or benefits resulting from entry restrictions and regulations that
had been received by CBs prior to privatization should be explicitly removed at the time of
privatization. This policy should be made transparent to potential purchasers.
4. MPBs could reasonably be privatized under an appropriate post-privatization regulatory
regime. However, governments should put the regulatory framework in place prior to
privatization.40 Ideally, this regulatory regime would encourage competition, reduce
inefficiencies in the privatized entity and be transparent on potential windfall taxes.
5. CBs and MPBs with an appropriate regulatory regime in place should be completely
privatized unless, and this is very unlikely, the company is too large relative relative to the
equity market. Partial privatization (mixed enterprise) is often the worst of both worlds.
6. In general, NVBs should not be privatized. If a government does want to privatize a NVB,
it should clarify its policy agenda going forward prior to any sale. This should include
clarification about whether the NVB will be required to pursue an ongoing public purpose
and, if so, it should specify the nature, use and extent of subsidies to achieve these purposes
(for example, for the subsidization of rural consumers).
7. Governments that dispose of businesses through share issues should sell them at the
revenue-maximizing price rather than giving them away or selling them at a reduced price.
Obviously, giving shares away reduces total privatization proceeds. It also means that
government will have to recoup these foregone proceeds through taxes, which has a
deadweight loss.41 Furthermore, giveaways lead to wide share dispersion, which might
entrench poor management and inhibit efficiency improvements.
40 The privatization of Telstra, the Australian telecommunications company and Eircom, the Irish telecommunications
company, illustrate the problems of not having an appropriate regulatory regime in place prior to privatization. For
more information about the privatization failure of Eircom see Palcic, D and E. Reeves, 2011, Privatisation in
Ireland: Lessons from a European Economy, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
41 Boardman, A.E., M.A. Moore and A.R. Vining, 2010, op. cit. 
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Of course, governments will be tempted to break these rules when it is politically beneficial to
do so. Credible commitment by governments is notoriously difficult, especially in
parliamentary systems that lack numerous veto points.42 Politicians tend to revert to either
maximizing revenue (for example, by selling enterprises with currently legislated monopoly
power as is, rather than creating a more competitive environment), or by maximizing interest
group support (for example, by providing direct or indirect ongoing subsidies to privatized
entities) or by maximizing votes (for example, by under-pricing IPO shares), rather than by
maximizing long-run social welfare. However, promulgating clear ex ante privatization rules
that would essentially be enforced by the administrative state raises the cost of reneging
somewhat, as it provides a quasi-veto point.
The political cost of actual or attempted privatization can be high, as illustrated by the
attempted privatization of NB Power (formerly the New Brunswick Power Corporation and the
New Brunswick Electric Power Commission) in 2009/10 via a proposed sale of most of its
assets to Hydro-Quebec. Even after the scope of the sale was reduced in 2010, it faced intense
opposition within the province, as well as from the province of Newfoundland and Labrador.
As a result, the sale was eventually abandoned.43 Former New Brunswick premier Shawn
Graham’s Liberal government almost certainly lost a subsequent provincial election because of
his initiation of this attempted sale.
It is encouraging that the federal government has broadly followed the spirit of these rules in
the announced privatization of AECL’s Commercial Division to SNC-Lavalin, while retaining
ownership of the Research Division. The federal government has spent $2 billion on AECL
over the last three years and over $21 billion in total. It will spend another $75 million to
complete the development of the enhanced Candu 6 reactor and will be liable for cost overruns
on existing projects. However, the Commercial Division is potentially profitable. It operates in
a globally competitive industry and competes against GE Hitachi Nuclear, Areva Group and
Toshiba Westinghouse. It is close to being a CB. The federal government maintains that it will
not provide further subsidies beyond those listed above. Importantly, it is not requiring
guarantees concerning the future scope and nature of the business. If SNC-Lavalin cannot
make money from designing and selling the new Candu 6 reactors, it would almost certainly
reduce the scope of the business, withdraw from the design and construction of new nuclear
electrical power plants, and focus on the profitable business of servicing and refurbishing the
existing Candu reactors. There will probably be significant job losses, but the government has
eliminated a significant contingent liability.
42 North, D. and B. Weingast, 1989, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Economic History, 49(4), 803-32; Miller, G., 2000, “Above
Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies,” Journal of Public Administration,
Research and Theory, 10(2), 289-327. 
43 Timm, J., 2010 “Power Failure in New Brunswick,” Canadian Business, 83(6), 17-18.
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